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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I.

The issues presented on appeal are whether the

trial court properly allowed the results of the field sobriety
tests and the refusal of the breath test to be admitted as
evidence,
II.

Whether a routine traffic stop and inquiry is an

investigatory interrogation and as suchf does not require a
Miranda warning in order to allow pre-arrest statements to be
admitted into evidence.
III.

Whether field sobriety tests do not violate a

person1s constitutional right against self-incrimination.

-iii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 20900

EARL W. EAST,

Category No. 2

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment issued by the Second
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornabyr presiding.
The Second District Court affirmed the decision of the
Honorable K. Roger Beanf Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court,
Layton Department, Davis County, State of Utah.
The Fourth Circuit Court found appellant guilty of
Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of
U.C.A. § 41-6-44(2).

In reaching that decision, Judge Bean

denied appellant's motion to suppress the evidence of the field
sobriety tests and of the refusal of the breathalyzer test.
On appeal, Judge Cornaby affirmed the lower court's
decision to deny appellant's motion.

The Fourth District Court

held that:
1.

The peace officer had reasonable grounds to stop

appellant's car because of apparent traffic violations.

2.

A stop for a traffic offense does not require a

Miranda warning.
3.

The officer correctly investigated the possibility

that appellant was intoxicated after the officer noted an odor of
alcohol.
4.

The officer properly requested appellant to take

field sobriety tests.
5.

The appellant voluntarily consented to take the

6.

Field sobriety tests do not violate appellant's

tests.

right against self-incrimination because such tests are not
testimonial or communicative evidence.
7.

After the field sobriety tests, the officer

formally arrested appellant for DUI and gave him his Miranda
warning.

The officer then properly requested appellant to take a

breathalyzer test which he refused to do.
8.

The appellant's right against self-incrimination

was not violated and the results of the field tests and of the
refusal of the breath test were properly admitted in the trial
court as evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 10, 1985, Officer Neal Wagner and Assisting
Officer Wilford Jensen, while driving southbound on 1-15,
observed a vehicle speeding northbound in the opposite direction
at 68 miles an hour (T.4).

The officers turned their vehicle

around and followed the speeding automobile for approximately two
miles (T.5).

During that time, the officers saw the vehicle
-2-

change lanes twice without signaling and weave across the lane
divider twice (T.5).
The officers stopped the vehicle.

The appellant,

responding to Officer Wagner1s questions, produced his driver's
license and said he had had a couple of beers (T.5).

The

officer, noting an odor of alcohol and slow speech, asked
appellant to take some field sobriety tests.

The appellant

replied, "I will." Appellant performed the tests poorly (T.6 and
7) .
Following the field sobriety tests, Officer Wagner
placed appellant under arrest, gave him the Miranda warning, and
asked him to take a breathalyzer test.

Appellant refused (T.7).

He was belligerent and argumentative (T.7).
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT
The trial court and the district court on appeal was
constitutionally correct in admitting evidence of field sobriety
tests and refusal to take the chemical test in appellantfs DUI
trial.

The admitting of the evidence does not violate the

appellant's Federal 5th amendment rights as the evidence was
given in a non-custodial circumstance which does not require a
Miranda warning.

In addition, the evidence given was not

testimonial nor was it compelled, and it was therefore properly
admitted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY CORRECT
IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE FIELD SOBRIETY
TESTS.

-3-

A.

AN INVESTIGATORY STOP AND INQUIRY DOES
NOT REQUIRE A MIRANDA WARNING AND
EVIDENCE ACQUIRED WITHIN THAT
INVESTIGATORY INTERROGATION IS ADMISSIBLE,
ESPECIALLY IF NOT COMPELLED.

The purpose of the Miranda warning is to provide
"procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination" found in the 5th Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.

Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 U.S.

436, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R. 3d 974 (1966).
The necessity of Miranda arises when police conduct a custodial
interrogation defined as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way."
Xd. at 444. The U.S. Supreme Court in California v. Beheler. 103
S. Ct. 3517 (1983) stated that whether the restraints on a
suspect's freedom were significant depended upon the "ultimate
inquiry" into whether there was "a formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
arrest."

(emphasis added)
The Supreme Court has used two standards to determine

when an investigation changes from investigatory to custodial.
One is the "focus" test articulated in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478f 12 L.Ed. 2d 977r 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964) and relied upon
by appellant which states that when a police investigation is no
longer a general one and indeed focuses on a particular suspect,
then the investigation becomes custodial and Miranda is required.
Another standard is the objective/subjective test used in

Beckwith v. United Statesr 425 U.S. 341, 48 L.Ed. 2d l, 96 s. ct.

-4-

1612 (1976) and in Oregon v. Mathiason. 429 U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct.
711f

50 L.Ed. 2d 714 (1977) which applies Miranda if the actions

of the police and the surrounding circumstances would reasonably
lead a suspect to believe that he was not free to leave at will.

See Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda; What
Constitutes Custodial InterrogaUon?r 25 s.c. L. Rev. 669 (1974).
In Beckwith, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the "in
custody" requirement could be satisfied simply because police
questioned someone who was the "focus" of a criminal
investigation.

The Court made clear that "focus" is questioning

"Altar." a person has been taken into custody.
(emphasis added)

Beckwithr at 1616.

The Court now seems to look at the totality of

the circumstances of each case to determine whether or not a
suspect is in "custody."

&££ Mathiason, Behelerr and Berkemer.

In determining custodial interrogation and the necessity
of Miranda protection, the Supreme Court specifically said that
roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine
misdemeanor traffic stop is not a custodial interrogation.
arrest questioning is custodial.
U.S.

Post

Berkemer v. McCarty. 468

, 82 L.Ed. 2d 317, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984).

that case and the case at bar are nearly identical.

The facts of
In BerkemerP a

peace officer observed the suspect's car weaving across the
lane divider.

The officer stopped the car, requested the driver

to get out of the vehicle, and asked him if he were intoxicated.
The driver had difficulty standing, his speech was slurred
and he responded saying that he had consumed two beers and
smoked several joints of marijuana.

-5-

The officer asked the

driver to perform a field sobriety test.

After the testr the

officer formally placed the driver under arrest and transported
him to jail.
The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that a traffic stop
significantly curtails freedom of action because one is not free
to ignore a policeman's signal or to drive away without
permission.

However, an ordinary traffic stop is not custodial

because it is presumptively "temporary and brief" and a driver
can usually expect that he will be allowed to continue on his
way.

Berkemer. at 333. Also, a typical traffic stop does not

place a motorist completely at the mercy of the police because
the stop is public and "noncoercive."

Xd.

Therefore, the stop

was not custodial, Miranda was not applicable, and the statements
of the driver and the results of the field sobriety test without
a Miranda warning were admissible.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Salt Lake City v.
earner, 664 P.2d 1168, (1983) conforms to that of the Supreme
Court,

earner involved a routine stop for a traffic violation

which then developed into an arrest for driving while
intoxicated.

The Utah court said that "temporary detention for

the purpose of investigating alleged traffic violations is not
synonymous with in-custody interrogation which requires a Miranda
warning."

Garner at 1170. The court recognized four important

factors in determining whether a suspect is in custody in the
absence of a formal arrest.
interrogation, 2)
accused, 3)

They are 1)

the site of

whether the investigation focused on the

whether the objective indicia of arrest were

-6-

present; and 4)

the length and form of interrogation,

earner,

at 1171.
As in earner, the facts of the case at bar do not
contain the circumstances needed for "custody."

The field

sobriety tests were requested and taken on a public street.

No

indicia of arrest such as handcuffs, guns, or locked doors were
present.
period.

The performance of the tests lasted only a short
The environment, though perhaps authoritative was not

coercive.

Additionally, as the Court in earner pointed out,

although the investigation focused on the driver, "that was true
at the point of initial observation; and no one would argue that
a Miranda warning was obligatory at that point."
1171.

CarnerP at

The U.S. Court also said mere "focus is not enough to

trigger custody and consequently Miranda,"

S£& Beckwith. supra

at p. 3.
The Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court have obviously seen the ridiculous consequences that would
follow if appellant's focus and evidence against self arguments
were accepted by the Court.

Under appellant's proposed standard,

all peace officers could only stop a vehicle for violations other
than the DUI.

Then they would be required to give the Miranda

warning (presumably over a loud speaker), some time between
having the window rolled down and smelling the odor associated
with alcohol.

After Miranda, the unarrested (because of lack of

evidence) driver could refuse to cooperate or give even physical
evidence and roll up the window and go to sleep until sober. The
unsafe driver could drive while under the influence, until or
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unless he is caught and then simply "take a nap" and never be
successfully prosecuted for the offense of DUI.

That adverse

result would of course be contrary to public policy and public
safety.
In the instant casef appellant was pulled over because
of a moving traffic violation.

After the officer detected the

odor of alcohol and slow speech, he could investigate, indeed he
had a duty to investigatef "suspicious circumstances in order to
determine whether a crime has been committed."

earner, at 1170,

citing State v, Carlsen, 480 P.2d 736 (Utah 1971).

Miranda need

not be given until the "police have both reasonable grounds to
believe a crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to
believe that the defendant committed it."

earner, at 1171. 2&S.

jalfifl Berkemer at 334. Without an investigation, a police officer
would seldom find the requisite probable cause and any subsequent
arrest would be illegal.

To require Miranda before any question

or request would be "wholly impractical."

Carlsen. at p. 737 and

earner p. 1170 (on suppression of field tests).

Field sobriety

tests help to provide police with adequate probable cause to
arrest an intoxicated driverr thereby making the highways safer
and the tests also allow them to release the innocent driver.
The police officer's questions and request directed at
appellant to take field sobriety tests were investigatory in
order to acquire probable cause for a formal arrest.

Appellant's

response to the questions and his agreement to take the field
tests were voluntary and were not compelled by the officer.
in fact agreed by specifically stating, "I will"

-8-

(T.6).

He

The

fact that most people will respond to a police request and do so
without being told that they are free not to respond does not
"eliminate the consensual nature of the response."

I.N.S. v.

Delgado. 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984), and £am££ at 1172 (holding that
the defendant was "not compelled to give evidence against himself
in violation of our State constitution.")
Since appellant was not in custody until his arrest, a
Miranda warning was not needed until then.
statements and actions were voluntary.

His pre-arrest

Thusr the appellant's 5th

Amendment rights were not violated and the field test evidence
was properly admitted by the trial court.
Furthermore, the act of refusing and the statement of
refusal to take the breathalyzer test was properly admitted as
evidence before the trial court.

The testimony was that the

officer arrested appellant and gave him a Miranda warning before
requesting him to take a breathalyzer test.
Report Form)

(See Sworn DUI

£££ Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979).

Thus, appellant's subsequent acts and refusal statements were
admissible evidence.
The absence of a Miranda warning does not give a driver
any right to refuse to take the test or to withdraw the consent
authorized by statute.

U.C.A. S 41-6-44.10(1)

In a civil

proceeding, it does not justify excluding evidence of the
driver's statements and actions regarding that request.

Smith v.

£ Q X , 609 P.2d 1332. Holman1s statement requiring a Miranda
warning in order to admit evidence of a refusal in a criminal
proceeding would not apply to non-communicative acts such as

-9-

silencef especially when such silence or lack of action is deemed
a refusal under Utah case law.

See Beck v. Cox, 597 p.2d 1335

(Utah 1979) and Conrad v. Schwendiman. 680 P.2d 736 (Utah 1984)f
requiring immediate consent.

Such acts are not only non-

communicative but not given in the compulsory setting

contemplated by Hixaiida.

South Dakota v, Neville, 459 U.S. 553f

103 S. Ct. 916r (1983).
Howeverf in this case, appellant made an oral statement
refusing to take the breathalyzer test.

Such statement was

voluntarily made and made following a Miranda warning and is
therefore admissible in a criminal trial.
B,

FIELD SOBRIETY OR ROADSIDE TESTS DO
NOT VIOLATE A PERSON'S PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THUS
A MIRANDA WARNING IS NOT REQUIRED IN
ORDER FOR SUCH EVIDENCE TO BE ADMITTED
INTO A COURT OF LAW.

In American Fork City v. Crosgrove. 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah
1 9 8 5 ) f the Utah Supreme Court i n t e r p r e t e d the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s
p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n in accordance with the
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution's fifth amendment.

The

U.S. Supreme court held in Schmerber v. Californiar 384 U.S. 757,
86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) that the fifth amendment
privilege applies only to evidence of a "testimonial or
communicative nature."

The Utah Supreme Court held that Article

lf section 2 of Utah's Constitution also protected an accused
only from being compelled to give "evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature," not real and physical evidence.
Fork at 1075.

American

The Utah Court stated that the difference in

language between the two constitutions was insignificant in light
-10-

of the historical intent of the framers of the state document and
in the common law definition and general acceptance that the
privilege only protected one from "testifying" against oneself.
Id. at 1072, 1073.
By virtue of the holding in American Fork, the Utah
court expressly overturned Hansen v. Owen. 619 P.2d 315 (Utah
1980).

The court rejected the idea that the Utah constitutional

privilege was more inclusive than the privilege within the U.S.
Constitution.

Also, the court rejected the affirmative act

standard used in Hansen which stated that an accused may not be
compelled to actively produce evidence against himself or to
perform any affirmative act that would produce such evidence.
American Fork, at 107 4.

Insteadr the Utah court followed the

vast majority of jurisdictions and held that only testimonial and
communicative evidence was protected and that the fifth amendment
privilege did not prevent a state from acquiring real or physical
evidence from an accused without his consent.

American Fork, at

1071, 1072.
Field sobriety tests, under the standard set out in
American Fork, being physical evidence, still would not violate a
person's privilege against self-incrimination.

Such tests are

authorized investigatory observations of physical and
nontestimonial evidence. SJ^S. Salt Lake v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168
(Utah 1983) (J. Durham's concurring opinion).

Therefore, the

results of field tests are admissible into evidence and a Miranda
warning is not required.
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Appellant argues that in order for American Fork to
apply in this matter, it would have to be applied retroactively.
However, this is not the case.

American Fork was decided June 4f

1985 and appellant was arrested on July 10, 1985.

In any event,

earner had been decided in 1983.
In conclusion, since the field or roadside tests were
not custodial, (Point I), not given in a Miranda type
inquisition, not compelled, and not testimonial communications,
then both Courts below were proper in admitting them into
evidence according to Miranda conforming with this Courtfs
holdings in in jCamex and American Fork.
CONCLUSION
Police must be allowed to stop drivers who are
violating traffic laws and then to investigate any suspicious
circumstances to determine if another crime of DUI is being
committed.

A routine traffic stop and inquiry is an

investigatory interrogation; it is not custodial and so a Miranda
warning is not required.

Therefore, any statements especially

voluntary ones, or actions made by appellant during the prearrest investigation are admissible as evidence in a court of
law.
The request for field sobriety tests do not violate a
person's privilege against self-incrimination under the United
States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution.

The

privilege against self-incrimination protects a person only from
being required to give testimonial or communicative evidence
against himself.

Real or physical evidence is not included
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within the privilege and therefore Miranda is not required.
Since field sobriety tests are of a physical nature, evidence of
such tests are admissible in a criminal proceeding.
The respondent respectfully requests this court to
uphold the findings of the district court and the circuit court.

Oi^

DATED this

day of April, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Phil L.
Hansen, attorney for appellant, 800 Boston Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84111 this

?/*-

day of April, 1986.
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STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintifff
vs.
EARL W. EAST,
Defendant.

RULING ON APPEAL
Criminal No. 4929

This appeal came before the court on August 13, 1985, with
Robert B. Hart appearing for the plaintiff and Phil L. Hansen
appearing for the defendant. Counsel requested a one week continuance which the court granted. Counsel thereafter requested
a ruling based upon the briefs filed with the court. The court
now rules on the appeal.
The arresting officer in this case stopped the defendant for
speeding. There was also a driving pattern involving two lane
changes without signaling and also the left wheels driving over
the lane divider. The officer could smell an odor of alcohol on
the defendant's breath on approaching him. At this point the officer could have issued the defendant a citation for speeding and
allowed him to proceed on his way. However, he suspected driving
under the influence of alcohol. This was a custodial stop.
Obviously the defendant was not free to leave. The defendant urges
the court to require the Miranda warning at this time. Mere suspicion of a traffic offense does not require the Miranda warning.
The officer asked the defendant how much he had to drink and he
replied two beers. The officer properly requested the defendant
to take field sobriety tests. The defendant consented. These
tests did not require the officer to advise the defendant of a
right against self-incrimination. The Utah Supreme Court in
American Fork City vs. Crosgrove, 11 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 stated:
m
History supports the conclusion, acs^)
cepted by the vast majority of authorities, that
&/
the commonlaw privilege is limited to testimonial
^j^%
and communicative evidence only and not to evidence y y /

-2of a real of physical nature such as that obtained
from a breathalyzer test."
The field sobriety tests are not "testimonial and communicative
evidence."
After the field sobriety tests were given, the officer formally arrested the defendant for DUI and gave him his Miranda
warning. This was the appropriate procedure. The Utah Supreme
Court in Holman vs. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (1979) said:
" . . . However, when a driver suspected of driving under the influence is arrested, he is at that point
involved in a criminal proceeding and must be given the
Miranda warning if his subsequent statements are to be
admitted in a criminal proceeding against him . . . ••
The Cox case involved the Driver License Division. The defendant
urges that an arrest takes place when the defendant's free right
of movement is stopped. This is technically correct, but the
Supreme Court has never required the Miranda warning at the point.
On the other hand it has not permitted officers to ask extensive
questions under the guise of custodial investigation. In the
case at hand the officer reasonably suspected DUI after giving
the field sobriety tests. Having arrested the defendant for DUI
it was proper to ask him to take a chemical test.
The defendant's right against self-incrimination was not
violated in this case and the lower court appropriately ruled.
This case is ordered returned to the Layton Department of the
Fourth Circuit Court with directions to execute the sentence.
Dated August 23, 1985.

This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Robert B. Hart, Davis
County Attorney's Office, Farmington, Utah and to Phil L. Hansen,
800 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on August 26,

